

Civic Coalition Proposal for Urgent Housing Relief for Eaton Fire Survivors

**Representing survivor groups, nonprofit and faith organizations, and
community partners across Los Angeles**

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Community Leaders Standing Together for Urgent Housing Relief

A historic coalition is coming together across Los Angeles to advance urgent housing relief for families displaced by the Eaton Fire. This effort is spearheaded by:

- **Eaton Fire Survivors Network**, a community of more than 10,000 survivors
- **Eaton Fire Collaborative Leadership Council**, which convenes more than 200 local nonprofit organizations engaged in recovery
- **Clergy Community Coalition**, a network of more than 150 pastors across Altadena and Pasadena
- **Altadena Town Council**, the elected body representing the 40,000+ people of Altadena

Building from this leadership base, survivor groups, nonprofit and faith partners, philanthropic institutions, and community organizations are uniting around a single goal: keeping families safely housed until they can return home. The **California Community Foundation** is an early endorser of the coalition, providing philanthropic leadership in advancing urgent housing relief and elevating the risks prolonged displacement poses to long-term recovery and community stability.

Already, this campaign has gained major visibility. The *Los Angeles Times* [highlighted](#) our work, and Senator Sasha Renée Pérez has called for immediate temporary housing assistance to ensure families are not forced to give up their rights simply to stay sheltered.

Your organization is invited to join us. Stand with families fighting to stay safely housed until they can get back home. Sign on with your name, title, and organization at edisonrelief.org.

As reported by the Los Angeles Times:

"Edison must ensure fire victims can recover and rebuild their lives with the support they are owed."

— Senator Sasha Renée Pérez

Current endorsing organizations include:

- Altadena Builds Back Foundation
- Altadena CoLab
- Altadena Earthseed Community Land Trust
- Altadena Girls
- Altadena Rising
- Altadena Tenants Union
- Altadena Town Council
- Altagether
- Black Freedom Fund
- Boys & Girls Club of Malibu
- Boys & Girls Club of Pasadena
- Buildnotes
- California Community Foundation
- CHIRLA
- Clergy Community Coalition
- Coalition for a Safe Fire Recovery
- Collaborate PASadena
- Community Compound
- Consumer Watchdog
- CORE : Community Organized Relief Effort
- Day One
- Door of Hope
- Eaton Fire Collaborative Leadership Council
- Eaton Fire Residents United
- Eaton Fire Survivors Network
- Epicentre Church
- Evolve Altadena
- Giant Steps Community Programs
- Leap of Faith
- Lifeline Fellowship
- Making Housing and Community Happen
- My TRIBE Rise
- Pasadena NAACP
- Project Passion
- Resilient Palisades
- Shared Harvest Foundation
- St. Vincent de Paul – St. Elizabeth Conference
- Stars: Illuminate, Educate, Advocate
- Surviving Structures - EF Recovery
- The Foothill Catalog Foundation
- YWCA of San Gabriel Valley

The coalition is expanding as more organizations add their voices to support urgent housing relief. For an updated list of coalition members, please visit: edisonrelief.org

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Executive Summary

Nearly one year after the Eaton Fire, the recovery is largely stalled. According to Department of Angels [research](#), more than 80% of Eaton Fire families remain displaced and are running out of housing funds. A historic civic coalition across Southern California has come together with one clear demand: keep Eaton Fire families housed until they can get back home. This coalition brings together survivor groups, nonprofit and faith organizations, philanthropic partners, community leaders, and elected officials representing tens of thousands of residents. They are united around an urgent reality: families are nearing homelessness while the company that caused the fire is financially protected and reporting soaring profits as a result of state actions.

The Eaton Fire destroyed or contaminated thousands of homes and decimated housing affordability overnight. Rents doubled or tripled across the region. As a result, insurance coverage meant to last multiple years is being depleted in a single year. Families facing eviction, living in cars, or who do not know where they will sleep next month cannot rebuild their homes or their lives. They are simply trying to survive day to day.

Edison alone has the financial capacity, the moral, legal, and civic responsibility, and the benefit of state-backed protections to prevent mass homelessness now.

In October, state leaders approved a last-minute wildfire-liability deal that dramatically improved Edison's finances. As the *Los Angeles Times* reported in an investigation headlined "[It's effectively a bailout](#)," the deal reshaped who bears the cost of wildfires, ensuring that all losses above the Wildfire Fund would be borne by Edison's ratepayers, not its shareholders. Edison emerged with protected revenues, secure credit, and guaranteed capital access, while survivors were left without protection.

That same month, regulators approved \$1 billion per year in new rate hikes plus \$1 billion in retroactive payments, and finalized a wildfire financing structure that shifts wildfire liabilities off Edison's balance sheet and onto the public through the California Wildfire Fund. **As a result of these state actions, Edison reported [profits up 61%](#), with CEO Pedro Pizarro citing these decisions as "[de-risking our financial outlook](#)."**

Because Edison is already financially protected, advancing temporary housing relief would cost the company no money. It would not increase Edison's liability or reduce shareholder returns. It would simply require Edison to front housing costs now and be reimbursed later, instead of forcing displaced families to carry those costs themselves.

Eaton Fire survivors are not only the people harmed by the fire. They are also Edison ratepayers, paying the bills that fund these protections while struggling to stay housed. Yet Edison has conditioned housing relief on families signing legal releases, forcing survivors to choose between shelter and their right to pursue full compensation. Families without stable housing cannot make free or informed legal decisions.

Every other California investor-owned utility has advanced urgent relief without waivers. PG&E and SDG&E advanced emergency housing relief after fires they caused, even before the Wildfire Fund existed and without guaranteed reimbursement. Edison is the only utility refusing to act, despite now being protected by a state-created fund expressly designed to reimburse utilities for the costs of fires they cause.

Our coalition's request is simple and urgent. Edison should front up to \$200,000 per displaced household in verified urgent housing relief, reimbursable through the Wildfire Fund, as a temporary cash-flow bridge that would immediately stop displacement and prevent mass homelessness.

Survivors whose homes were poisoned or burned by Edison's fire should not be pushed into homelessness while the company's shareholders remain insulated and enriched. Every survivor has a right to get back home, and that right cannot exist without housing stability. It is time for Edison to keep families housed so the Eaton Fire recovery can finally move forward.

👉 If you agree Edison must advance urgent housing relief now and recover those costs later, please add your name at edisonrelief.org.

1. What Edison Must Do Now: Urgent Housing Relief Program

Every survivor has the right to get back home. That right will be lost unless Edison fronts temporary housing support now.

Edison must immediately establish and fund an Urgent Housing Relief Program that fronts up to **\$200,000** per displaced household based on verified temporary housing and displacement costs. This assistance covers only actual temporary housing needs. It does not replace or duplicate long-term compensation. It is a temporary and fully recoverable advance that Edison can later reconcile through the California Wildfire Fund and deduct from a household's final recovery.

This proposal solves a timing problem, not a question of responsibility. Survivors are fronting housing and displacement costs caused by Edison's fire and are running out of funds. Edison, by contrast, has liquidity, access to capital, and public financial protections. Advancing housing relief now shifts the cash-flow burden from families who cannot carry it to the company that caused the harm, with Edison later seeking reimbursement for eligible costs through the California Wildfire Fund.

In practice, the program works in three simple steps:

1. **Edison advances modest housing funds over time** as survivors incur verified temporary housing and displacement costs. Payments are made as expenses arise, not upfront.
2. **Edison simultaneously resolves claims and seeks reimbursement** from the California Wildfire Fund for settlements, which are substantially larger than interim housing advances.
3. **Reimbursements replenish the housing fund**, allowing it to function as a revolving account rather than a one-time payout.

As a result, Edison's cash-flow exposure at any given time is **limited and temporary**, while families remain safely housed and able to recover.

This is not a lump-sum payout. Relief would be advanced only as verified housing and displacement costs are incurred over time, and held only temporarily, because Edison can seek reimbursement through the Wildfire Fund and, if needed, ratepayers. This structure prevents mass homelessness while avoiding any cash-flow exposure remotely close to headline totals.

The fire destroyed affordability, and insurance was never designed for the rent shock Edison caused.

Under California state law, families with insurance technically have a minimum of 36 months of insurance housing coverage, often called Additional Living Expense, or ALE, up to the dollar limit set in their policies. But according to the [Eaton Fire Collaborative \(EFC\) Housing Impact Survey](#), Edison's fire instantly doubled or tripled local rents, pushing temporary housing costs from roughly \$1,800 a month to **\$4,000–\$6,000**, plus deposits, duplicate utilities, storage, transportation, and childcare.

ALE was never designed for disaster-driven price shocks of this scale, so coverage that should have lasted two to three years is now depleted in less than a year because of the fire's impact on the local housing market.

As temporary housing expires, the pressure on survivors intensifies.

Where the WRCP fails families in urgent need.

This is where the Wildfire Recovery Compensation Protocol (WRCP) comes in. The WRCP is Edison's settlement framework. It is the company's process for determining what it will pay survivors for long term losses. It's the structured path Edison created to resolve property, personal, and economic damages from the fire. The WRCP was never designed to cover families' urgent housing needs. It focuses on long-term compensation, not the cash flow families need right now simply to stay stably housed.

The WRCP was not built to cover families' urgent housing needs or the immediate cash-flow gap that determines whether a family stays housed. It is a long-term compensation process, not a stabilization program. Nothing in California law requires Edison to withhold housing support until WRCP settlements are complete.

Yet Edison tells families they can receive housing relief only if they sign away their right to pursue valid claims under the WRCP. Edison's WRCP does not come close to covering real temporary housing costs. Thus, families are being forced into underfunded settlements simply to keep a roof overhead.

What the Urgent Housing Relief Program would provide:

- Up to **\$150,000** in forward-looking temporary housing and living support for verified, reasonable, and necessary costs that families must pay in order to remain safely sheltered while their homes are repaired or rebuilt.
- Up to **\$50,000** in reimbursement for verified out-of-pocket expenses already paid by survivors for temporary housing, relocation, debris cleanup, testing, and essential repairs.

Relief would cover verified temporary housing and displacement costs, including:

- Temporary housing expenses such as short-term or long-term rental units, room rentals, and other non-luxury shelter required due to displacement
- Housing access costs such as deposits, application fees, and credit checks
- Duplicate utilities and essential services at both the temporary residence and the damaged home
- Relocation and displacement expenses including moving, transportation, and storage
- Health and safety costs such as environmental testing, cleaning, remediation, and other necessary steps to restore habitability
- Other verified temporary housing-related costs necessary to maintain safe, continuous shelter

Eligibility based on unmet housing need, not ALE calendars.

Eligibility would extend to all homeowners and tenants displaced or unable to safely inhabit their homes due to destruction or contamination, including smoke-damaged standing homes. Eligibility does not depend on whether a household technically has remaining ALE months. Because Edison's fire caused rents to double or triple overnight, many families have already exhausted their ALE dollar limits even though they still appear to have time remaining on paper. Urgent housing relief must therefore be available to any displaced household with verified unmet housing needs. Verification will prevent duplication of costs, and any future insurance offsets are a matter between insurers and Edison, not survivors.

Payments would go directly to households.

Payments would be issued directly to survivors, not attorneys, with survivors acknowledging in writing that these payments are an advance against future recovery under the WRCP or future litigation.

These advances must be treated as non-insurance humanitarian assistance.

All advances must be designated as temporary housing stabilization, not insurance benefits. They do not replace, diminish, or satisfy any obligation owed by insurers. Verification procedures will ensure there is no duplication of costs already fully reimbursed by insurance. These advances simply fill unmet housing needs so survivors can remain safely sheltered until they can get back home.

Edison Has the Authority. It Just Needs the Will.

Edison already has the legal authority to act. California law leaves decisions about how to evaluate claims, when to settle them, and what costs to later seek reimbursement for with Edison. Regulators and the Wildfire Fund do not substitute their judgment for the company's. There is no legal requirement to delay housing assistance, and no legal barrier to advancing housing support now, without waivers, and reconciling eligible costs later.

The California Public Utilities Commission has already established an emergency disaster relief framework that requires utilities to implement emergency protections during declared disasters and allows them to track reasonable incremental costs for later review and potential recovery. This framework exists because disasters create immediate humanitarian needs that cannot wait for standard litigation or rate-case timelines. It provides the regulatory foundation Edison needs to act now.

Because this relief is fully recoverable through the California Wildfire Fund, the cost does not fall on Edison's shareholders in the long run. The Fund exists for exactly this purpose. The program changes **when** families receive support, not **how much** Edison ultimately pays.

Public protections have already stabilized Edison's finances. Survivors should not pay the price.

Although Edison offers little or no meaningful temporary housing assistance through the WRCP, this model still protects the company financially. Edison retains discretion over which temporary housing costs it later seeks reimbursement for from the California Wildfire Fund. The Fund was created to make sure fire survivors can get back home, not to limit utilities. In practice, this means that even as survivors receive urgent relief they were previously denied by the WRCP, Edison remains fully eligible to recover those same costs. The public framework continues to shield Edison from financial harm, even now, while families are the ones bearing the consequences of the company's fire.

In fact, PG&E and SDG&E advanced similar assistance without the benefit of the Wildfire Fund. Edison, uniquely, can front temporary housing support today and recover eligible costs later. No other utility has ever had such a safeguard.

Edison has both the capacity and the obligation to act. This program is the minimum required to prevent mass displacement, coerced settlements, and permanent loss of affordability across the region. Until urgent housing relief is provided, families cannot meaningfully exercise their right to get back home.

"Our whole town was wiped out, our entire lives were upended by the fire, our mental health continues to suffer, we pay out of pocket for fire-related expenses, and we have literally no recourse. Edison caused this fire, and must pay for all of this damage." – Eaton Fire Survivor

2. Every Other California Investor-Owned Utility Has Advanced Urgent Relief. Edison Is the Outlier.

PG&E and SDG&E advanced emergency housing aid years before the Wildfire Fund existed. They acted without any guaranteed reimbursement. Edison, by contrast, has a full financial backstop and still remains the only investor-owned utility that has chosen not to help displaced families remain housed.

After the 2015 Butte Fire, PG&E created an emergency assistance program that delivered upfront payments so displaced families could remain housed during the long claims process. These payments were issued before litigation and did not require legal releases. They served precisely the purpose this proposal is designed to serve: stabilizing households so they were not forced into premature settlements simply to avoid homelessness.

([Calaveras Enterprise coverage](#).) (Financial reference: PG&E Corp. 2016 Form 10-K, Note 13 "Wildfire Claims and Insurance." ([View SEC filings](#))

PG&E continued this approach during the Fire Victim Trust process. Even while in bankruptcy, the company ensured that survivors received initial payments years before their full claims were reviewed. A utility in financial distress still provided more timely housing support than Edison has provided while reporting record profits. These early payments allowed thousands of families to remain sheltered while long-term claims were processed. ([North Bay Business Journal, Nov. 2020 coverage](#))

SDG&E did the same after the 2007 Southern California wildfires, creating a Community Recovery Fund that delivered immediate grants to displaced residents while litigation was ongoing. The purpose was clear: families cannot rebuild, pursue claims, or remain connected to their communities unless they can maintain housing stability throughout the recovery period. (Program summary: Sempra Energy 2008 Form 10-K. [View SEC filing](#))

Every one of these programs operated under CPUC oversight. None required releases. None waited for litigation to conclude. All were explicitly designed as temporary assistance to preserve survivors' ability to remain housed, participate in claims processes freely, and eventually get back home.

Edison is the only utility refusing to advance urgent relief

Unlike PG&E during the Butte Fire or during the Fire Victim Trust period, Edison is not in financial collapse. Edison is profitable, investment grade, and backed by more than \$4 billion in committed credit lines. Yet it has chosen to provide no temporary housing support unless families permanently surrender their legal rights.

Edison stands alone not only in refusing upfront relief but in refusing it even with protections that PG&E and SDG&E never had. Edison is the only utility with a dedicated state Wildfire Fund available to reimburse eligible costs, yet it is also the only utility declining to act.

"This has caused so much stress, pain, agony. We are traumatized for life. I have not been able to go home due to the smoke damage. I have moved my family eight times since January. I am running out of insurance coverage and still displaced." – Eaton Fire Survivor

3. Why Edison Can and Must Act Now

Ratepayers ensured Edison's profits for years to come. Edison must now ensure survivors can make their way home from the fire it caused.

Edison has both the capacity and the responsibility to act immediately. The company is not in financial distress. It is reporting exceptionally strong performance, made possible entirely by the public framework California created to shield utilities from wildfire liability.

In October 2025, the California Public Utilities Commission approved a steep rate increase that guaranteed Edison long term revenue growth and nearly \$1 billion in back pay for the first nine months of the year. This decision locked in predictable, high level profits for years to come and ensured the company would move forward with a protected balance sheet.

Days later, Edison reported \$832 million in quarterly profit, a \$316 million increase over the same quarter the year before. Core earnings per share jumped to \$2.34, far above Wall Street expectations. On the investor call, CEO Pedro Pizarro told shareholders:

"We have made significant progress on the regulatory front this year, further de-risking our financial outlook and bolstering our ability to deliver for customers and investors."

That de-risking came from Senate Bill 254 and the broader wildfire framework that allows utilities to securitize wildfire liabilities and tap the California Wildfire Fund. This framework shifts a significant share of wildfire settlement risk away from immediate shareholder exposure and into a system funded by ratepayers and shareholder contributions, while guaranteeing steady cash flow for utilities that meet statutory requirements.

Journalists have spelled it out. In an investigation headlined *"It's effectively a bailout,"* the *Los Angeles Times* reported that utility customers will ultimately bear the **full cost of settlements that exceed the Wildfire Fund** through higher electricity bills. Separate *Times* investigations show that customers and shareholders have already paid tens of billions of dollars through bill surcharges and required capital contributions (see here and here).

Credit agencies responded immediately. Fitch removed Edison from negative watch. Moody's reaffirmed a stable outlook. S&P confirmed investment grade status. Edison now holds more than \$4 billion in available credit and \$364 million in cash, backed by ratepayer-funded revenues and state guarantees.

Unlike PG&E and SDG&E, which stepped up long before the Wildfire Fund existed, Edison can advance temporary housing relief with full assurance that eligible costs can later be reimbursed. No other utility has ever been given such a financially risk free pathway to support survivors.

The state safeguarded Edison. Edison has not safeguarded survivors.

Taken together, these public actions have underwritten Edison's long term profitability. The company's financial security is the result of decisions made by regulators, lawmakers, ratepayers, and shareholders who absorbed much of the risk created by wildfire liability.

Edison must now carry its share of responsibility. Fronting temporary housing relief up to \$200,000 per displaced household is not generosity. It is the minimum required for fairness. Edison's executives and shareholders benefit directly from the public's support. Fire survivors must benefit as well.

Despite the unprecedented public support that has strengthened Edison's finances, survivors are living in an entirely different reality. Edison's executives and shareholders are protected by ratepayer guarantees and shareholder contributions into state created funds, while the families harmed by the company's equipment, who are themselves ratepayers, are left to shoulder the economic fallout of the fire every single day.

The [doubling and tripling of rents after the fire](#) destabilized families across the region. This housing market shock is now the primary force pushing families out of their communities, and it stems directly from Edison's negligence. In this context, urgent housing relief is not optional. It is the only way to prevent permanent displacement.

"The expense of this ordeal, emotionally and financially, has impacted our family so much that my daughter may have to put college on hold. We may have to walk away from our home of 25 years flushing our equity down the drain because it's not safe to live in. And finally the impact that it's had on my mental health and my marriage. I'm not sure my husband and I will see our way through this together." – Eaton Fire Survivor

4. The Fire Destroyed Affordability. Edison Must Prevent Permanent Displacement.

The Eaton Fire wiped out one of the region's last affordable communities. Without urgent housing relief, that loss will become permanent.

The Eaton Fire did not just destroy homes. It destroyed affordability itself.

Before the fire, Altadena was one of the few remaining places in the region where working families, seniors, and long-time residents could still afford to live. Pre-fire rents averaged \$1,792, and many tenants were protected by Los Angeles County rent stabilization, according to the [Eaton Fire Collaborative \(EFC\) Housing Impact Survey](#). The survey shows 91% of renters and 55% of homeowners were underinsured or uninsured and therefore had little or no coverage for displacement or temporary housing. Yet families could remain in their neighborhoods because rents were still within reach and protections kept sudden increases in check.

The fire erased that entire ecosystem overnight. Families were suddenly competing in one of the tightest rental markets in the nation, where rents immediately doubled or tripled. The Department of Angels [reports](#) that nearly a year into recovery, most families remain in temporary or unstable housing because they cannot afford the soaring cost of post-fire rents. More than one in three [will be forced](#) to move again within months due to a lack of cash for long-term shelter.

Similarly, the [EFC survey](#) shows:

- 72% of renters are still in need of housing, months after the fire.
- 68% of renters experienced a total loss, yet 78% cannot afford the average rent for a one-bedroom in Altadena, now \$2,350.
- 32% of renters previously lived in extremely low-cost family or informal arrangements, often paying under \$1,000 a month, which have no replacement in the post-fire market.

For these households, a post-fire rent of \$2,350 or more is not just an increase. It is the disappearance of any comparable housing option in the region. Nothing replaces what the fire destroyed. Landlords are not required to

rebuild at affordable rates. Rent stabilization does not apply to newly listed or reconstructed units. The affordability that once allowed working families, seniors, essential workers, and long-standing residents to remain rooted has been effectively erased.

Homeowners face a different but equally destabilizing set of pressures. Many remain displaced and cannot afford current local rents despite an average household monthly income of \$5,346. Even when rebuilds are completed, many warn they may not be able to return because insurance premiums are already spiking across the region. Families also face spiking construction costs driven by tariffs, labor shortages, and market volatility. Many express real uncertainty about whether they will be able to secure affordable insurance at all after rebuilding in the aftermath of such an unprecedented fire.

Households with partially damaged or standing homes face steep losses in property value due to contamination, costly remediation, and market stigma. These are not temporary setbacks. They are lasting structural harms.

For many families, especially those in communities shaped by decades of redlining and housing exclusion, the loss is even more profound. The fire did not just destroy a structure. It threatens to erase one of the last remaining footholds of stability, legacy, and community belonging that was historically denied to them.

Taken together, the fire's destruction of affordability is now one of the primary drivers of displacement, and it is a direct result of Edison's negligence. Families who had stable homes before the fire now face permanent exclusion from their own community unless temporary housing relief allows them to remain nearby while remediation and rebuilding proceed.

As housing costs soar, the federal support that normally helps stabilize long term recovery is simply not there. As Philanthropy California's 2025 primer, [How Federal Changes are Shifting Disaster Resilience in California](#), documents, Los Angeles has not received the long term CDBG-DR housing funds that historically supported rebuilding after major fires. FEMA awards are smaller, eligibility is tighter, and supplemental programs have been cut or delayed. The federal scaffolding that stabilized past recoveries is gone. With no federal floor beneath them, families have nowhere to turn except the company that caused the fire. Edison has both the capacity and the obligation to fill this gap.

This crisis is structural, not short-term. Without urgent intervention, thousands of families will be forced out of the San Gabriel Valley altogether, fracturing schools, congregations, workplaces, and the cultural fabric that held this community together long before the fire.

Edison has the obligation and capacity to prevent this permanent displacement. Urgent housing relief is the only tool that can stabilize households long enough for them to reclaim their right to get back home.

"On paper, my day job looks like I make a decent living. In reality, the current rental rates for anything comparable to what I had, would mean I'd pay more than 50% of my take-home pay just to put a roof over my head. This is untenable financially." – Eaton Fire Survivor

5. Housing Instability Is Driving Premature WRCP Settlements

No survivor should have to choose between a roof and their rights.

As temporary housing expires, the pressure on survivors intensifies. And it is even more sweeping than that. Families are asked to sign documents that permanently waive their right to seek full compensation or to ever sue the company for the harm its fire caused.

In plain terms, Edison is asking people to give up their future in order to survive the present.

This turns a humanitarian crisis into a bargaining tool. Survivors with financial reserves may be able to wait for fair compensation. Families without reserves cannot. The people living closest to the financial edge feel the most pressure to accept premature, underfunded settlements simply to avoid homelessness. Housing instability

becomes the lever that pushes families to lock in settlements that undervalue their losses and erase their legal rights forever.

Tenants, smoke damaged households, and underinsured families have endured nearly a year of sharply increased rents, uncovered housing costs, and savings stretched past their limits.

Most never had full insurance coverage to begin with. As temporary housing ends, these households are often the first to feel they have no option except to accept WRCP settlements, even when the awards fall far below the cost of rebuilding or returning home.

Housing instability magnifies this pressure

Families facing eviction, hunger, or homelessness cannot exercise free will. Linking essential shelter to legal waivers turns survival into leverage. The principle is simple: the party that causes the harm has an obligation to prevent further harm. Edison's fire displaced these families, and the company has a duty to ensure they are not pushed into surrendering their future just to keep a roof overhead.

Urgent housing relief and long term compensation serve entirely different purposes:

- **Humanitarian relief** keeps people safely housed during remediation and rebuilding.
- **Compensatory settlements** address long term damages, contamination, permanent loss of affordability, health impacts, and community wide harm.

When these two functions are collapsed inside the WRCP, families are asked to make binding legal decisions while still in acute crisis, without stable housing, financial security, or mental clarity. California law is clear that consent obtained under duress is not valid consent.

Edison can end this dynamic immediately. The company can front urgent housing funds now, without requiring releases, using its existing credit lines and later reconciling those costs through the California Wildfire Fund. This keeps families safely housed while preserving the integrity of all future settlements, whether through the WRCP or other mechanisms.

Separating urgent relief from compensation also protects Edison and the state. Families who sign agreements under severe financial pressure may later argue that their releases were invalid. Creating a clear firewall between emergency housing support and legal settlements ensures that all agreements are lawful, voluntary, and durable.

Urgent housing relief is not a damages award. It is a temporary, fully recoverable advance that allows survivors to participate in the compensation process freely, not under threat of losing their homes.

The path forward is clear. Make sure families are safe and housed first. Then, and only then, can fair and lawful settlements follow. When temporary housing is tied to legal waivers, survivors are forced to choose between shelter and their future. No family can exercise their right to get back home when the only path to a roof is signing away the very claims needed to rebuild.

"As a renter w 2 kids: We lost a house and all contents and were displaced for many months moving to every few weeks due to limited LOU from renters insurance. Our kids schools were displaced too. I believe I indirectly lost my job due to the fire and my wife was passed over for what seemed to be a guaranteed promotion." – Eaton Fire Survivor

6. How Edison's WRCP Puts the Most Vulnerable at Risk

The WRCP does not fail survivors evenly. It fails the households with the least financial cushion first and hardest. These are the families being pushed toward premature settlements simply to stay housed.

The Eaton Fire is the largest urban toxic fire in United States history, yet the WRCP treats it as an ordinary wildfire. Edison's framework ignores that its fire both destroyed homes and poisoned thousands of standing homes, creating losses far beyond what the WRCP recognizes or compensates.

Two independent analyses by survivor groups ([here](#) and [here](#)) found that the WRCP is not designed to keep families housed or move recovery forward. The reviews concluded that the plan systematically excludes renters, smoke-damaged households, and other vulnerable families, relies on pre-fire assumptions that do not reflect post-fire reality, and provides housing assistance far below current market rents, leaving many families displaced.

The WRCP places the greatest burden on the families who entered this disaster with the fewest resources. These households began the fire with limited insurance, minimal savings, and little ability to absorb prolonged displacement. After nearly a year of sharply increased rents, overlapping living costs, and exhausted reserves, they are the first to run out of options and the most likely to feel compelled to accept WRCP settlements, not because the awards meet their needs, but because their temporary housing has ended.

The WRCP contains four structural failures that create these inequities:

1. It does not make survivors whole for documented losses.
2. It does not account for the long and costly realities of rebuilding.
3. It undercompensates households that were already most vulnerable before the fire, including tenants and underinsured families.
4. It does not reflect the scale of community-wide harm caused by the disaster.

Tenants bear the brunt of the WRCP's failings

For tenants, the shortcomings are especially severe. Tenants who lost their homes receive far less than homeowners, even though their displacement, contamination, and loss of belongings mirror the experience of homeowners. Under the WRCP:

- Total-loss tenants in single-family homes are capped at \$25,000 per adult and just three months of pre-fire rent.
- Tenants in apartments, ADUs, and backhouses receive even less, solely because of the type of structure they lived in.
- Tenants in contaminated standing homes receive no temporary housing support at all, even though many remain displaced because landlords cannot or will not test, remediate, and restore the property to safe conditions.
- Contents payments cover only a fraction of what families lost.

Homeowners in standing or partially damaged homes face parallel barriers

Homeowners in partially damaged or smoke-damaged standing homes face parallel barriers. Edison's flat payments bear no relationship to the real cost of cleaning and restoring contaminated properties. Even homes with no structural damage routinely require testing, removal and replacement of attic insulation, HVAC ducting replacement, hazardous materials cleanup, and large-scale contents replacement. These repairs frequently exceed \$100,000, yet the WRCP offers only \$10,000 for homes located in or near the arbitrary map that Edison chose for eligibility determinations.

Thousands of contaminated homes located just outside Edison's self-selected lines receive nothing at all, regardless of verified contamination and documented expenses. For partially structurally damaged homes, payments of \$15,000 to \$50,000 fall dramatically short of the six-figure costs required to restore habitability.

Insurance offsets deepen the inequity

The WRCP deducts 100% of potential insurance benefits up front, including amounts that are unpaid, delayed, or under active investigation. This shifts insurer misconduct onto families twice:

- first when insurers delay or deny claims, and
- again when Edison subtracts funds survivors have never actually received

These offsets ignore well-documented realities. The Department of Angels [reports](#) that 70% of survivors face insurance delays and denials, the Eaton Fire Survivors Network [has documented](#) nearly 500 first-hand Eaton and Palisades accounts of insurer misconduct, and both the California Department of Insurance and Los Angeles County have opened investigations into State Farm's claims practices.

Edison's choice to assume full and timely insurance payouts, despite this record, benefits the company at the direct expense of the households harmed by its fire.

The most financially insecure families are the most vulnerable

They are the first to run out of options and the first to be pushed toward unfair settlements simply to stay housed. WRCP gaps show up as uncovered rent, prolonged displacement, permanent rent increases, drained savings, and temporary housing that ends long before rebuilds can begin. The WRCP withholds what recovery requires and then offers underfunded settlements in exchange for permanent legal releases.

The families who need a fair chance to get back home are the least able to achieve it under the WRCP as currently designed. A compensation system that denies adequate temporary housing support cannot credibly claim to make survivors whole. No utility can meet its responsibility to repair the harm it caused while leaving families without the stability required to get back home.

This framework pushes the steepest costs onto the households least able to bear them. No fair system allows such inequity to define recovery.

Urgent housing relief is therefore not merely a supplement to the WRCP. It is the only practical tool that ensures tenants, smoke-damaged households, and underinsured families can remain safely housed long enough to participate in the claims process voluntarily rather than out of fear of homelessness.

 For a deeper analysis of the Edison Wildfire Compensation Plan, see survivors' independent analysis, [Fix What You Broke: Survivors' Recommendations for a Fair and Fully Funded Edison Recovery Program](#) and update on the final plan, [You Didn't Fix What You Broke: An Update on Edison's Final Compensation Plan](#).

"Our apartment burned. The smoke and stress worsened my husband's COPD. Now, he has severe emphysema and relies on oxygen. We're living in a small studio without a proper kitchen, struggling to manage his health and the costs of food and medication." – Eaton Fire Survivor

7. What Happens If Edison Does Not Act

If Edison refuses to advance urgent housing relief, mass displacement, generational loss of wealth, and escalating public costs are guaranteed, not hypothetical.

If Edison does not act, the pressures described in earlier sections do not merely continue. They become permanent. Families who exhaust their insurance housing coverage will face impossible choices. Some will sign WRCP settlements that do not reflect their documented losses simply to stay sheltered. Others will fall into vehicle living, overcrowded conditions, or homelessness. Once families are scattered, it becomes exponentially harder for them to return, rebuild, or re-establish community roots.

Survivors' right to get back home cannot be exercised if survivors are forced out of the region before their homes are safe to inhabit or because they cannot afford to remain and rebuild. When Edison's inaction pushes families

away, it effectively denies them the ability to reclaim their lives, their communities, and, for tenants in particular, their pre-fire housing affordability.

Permanent displacement becomes widespread and irreversible

If Edison fails to intervene, the fire's destruction of affordability will become irreversible. Households priced out of Altadena and surrounding communities will be pushed into distant cities, severing ties to jobs, schools, medical providers, and care networks. Over time, this displacement will reshape who is able to remain in the region at all, replacing long-standing residents, working families, seniors, and essential workers with those able to absorb sharply higher rents and reconstruction costs.

Public systems and philanthropy cannot absorb the consequences of Edison's inaction

Local governments, nonprofits, and philanthropy are already stretched far beyond their capacity to fill federal gaps. A Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation [study](#) finds that between 2017 and 2021, wildfires caused an average of **\$117 billion** in annual losses in California. By contrast, the Center for Disaster Philanthropy's *State of Disaster Philanthropy* reports are published on a two-year retrospective basis. The [2025 report](#), reflecting 2023 data, shows that **total U.S. philanthropic giving specifically to wildfires nationwide was only \$123 million**. Wildfires inflict losses in the tens of billions; philanthropy operates in the hundreds of millions. The scale of need and the scale of resources are nowhere near aligned.

As a result, the systems that sustain daily life in the region will be overwhelmed. School districts will lose enrollment and funding. Clinics and hospitals will see rising mental health and chronic stress caseloads. Social service providers and faith communities will be confronted with escalating need. Local governments will be forced to respond to waves of preventable housing instability with insufficient resources.

These cascading effects deepen the psychological toll on survivors and strain the very institutions that support community recovery. When families lose any realistic path home, the mental health impacts intensify, and the cost to the broader region grows rapidly.

Edison's long-term exposure will grow, not shrink

Survivors pushed into bankruptcy, homelessness, or prolonged health crises due to unsafe living conditions will be entitled to larger settlements (or awards) later, not smaller. Delay does not reduce liability. It magnifies it.

Trust in the system will erode further

Finally, the trust gap between Edison and the communities it serves will widen. Ratepayers and shareholders have already underwritten Edison's financial stability under the state-created wildfire framework and shielded it from catastrophic loss. If the company refuses to use that protection to keep displaced families safely housed, it signals that these protections are a one-way benefit. A utility cannot claim accountability while families lose their homes and their right to return to the communities harmed by the utility's own equipment.

Inaction does not preserve the status quo. It locks in a future defined by permanent displacement, deepening inequity, greater mental-health harm, and substantially higher economic and legal costs for everyone. The Department of Angels [finds](#) that nearly a year after the fire, most families are no closer to getting back home because they lack the cash flow to remain housed while rebuilding moves forward. Edison is the only actor that can close this gap now.

"We lost our Altadena home after living there for over 40 years. Now in our seventies, we're staying with family, traveling seven hours each way for doctor visits, coping with PTSD and depression, and trying to rebuild with an insurance payout that covers only half of what we need — this SCE housing relief would truly be a godsend." — Eaton Fire Survivor

8. The Wildfire Fund Was Designed to Speed Relief. Delays Are Undermining Its Purpose

A system designed to speed relief has become a bottleneck, and only Edison can unlock it.

The California Wildfire Fund was established in 2019 through AB 1054 to ensure that investor-owned utilities could meet their obligations to fire survivors without delay. Its purpose is clear: to provide immediate liquidity so that families are not forced to wait years for compensation while utilities navigate litigation, credit stress, or bankruptcy risk. This is precisely the cash-flow gap that is now pushing Eaton Fire survivors toward eviction, homelessness, or pressured WRCP settlements.

The Legislature even defined the Fund as “a liquidity fund to help enable electrical corporations to pay eligible claims,” in the [Legislative Counsel’s Digest for AB 1054 \(2019\)](#), establishing that utilities are expected to stabilize survivors immediately while long-term financial and legal processes run their course.

In other words, the Fund was designed so utilities can pay first and reconcile later, which is exactly the over-time cash-flow bridge required to keep families housed now.

Together, these legislative materials establish a single, unmistakable mandate: the Fund exists so that survivors are not stranded while utilities complete long-term legal or financial processes. It was built to prevent exactly the housing crisis now unfolding in the Eaton Fire zone.

What the Legislature envisioned is simple. When a utility’s equipment ignites a wildfire, survivors should not be forced to wait years while legal and financial processes unfold. The Wildfire Fund framework exists so utilities can pay survivors promptly and seek reimbursement later, rather than delaying payments while families face financial collapse. Delay was never the intent. The point was speed.

Instead of stabilizing survivors, the current system has inverted the Legislature’s purpose. Edison has experienced full financial protection under AB 1054, including access to the Wildfire Fund after meeting safety certification requirements. Survivors, however, have received none of the speed or stability the law was designed to guarantee.

The Fund is already financed and ready to be used

The Fund is financed jointly by utility shareholders, through multibillion-dollar upfront contributions, and by electric ratepayers, through a dedicated monthly charge. After a utility meets its statutory safety certification requirements, the Fund reimburses eligible wildfire claim costs above the utility’s deductible (approximately one percent of its annual transmission and distribution revenue).

Nothing in state law prevents Edison from using this structure exactly as designed: to front urgent temporary housing assistance now and reconcile eligible costs later. The Fund’s purpose is to give utilities the financial protection needed to stabilize households immediately, not after litigation concludes or settlement protocols are exhausted.

When Edison chooses not to use these tools, the result is not a neutral delay

It widens the gap between what displaced families need today and when current processes can deliver support. The Eaton Fire recovery is now stalled not because the system lacks a solution, but because Edison has declined to activate it.

Because ratepayers and shareholders have already underwritten Edison’s long-term financial stability under AB 1054, advancing temporary housing relief is not an added burden. It is a core function of the wildfire-liability framework the Legislature built. The Wildfire Fund covers eligible wildfire losses above Edison’s deductible, which means Edison can provide urgent housing relief now **using its credit capacity** and determine later whether, and how much, to recover from the Fund. Financially, this is a timing decision, not a new liability.

The Fund protects Edison even when the WRCP does not protect survivors

Edison's ability to recover these advances underscores a stark reality: even after providing little or no temporary housing support through the WRCP, this proposal still ensures Edison is kept whole. The Wildfire Fund was built to stabilize utilities so survivors could be stabilized in turn. Instead, survivors have absorbed the risk while Edison has been protected at every step.

Temporary housing advances function as bridge payments that will ultimately be reconciled through the same wildfire-cost mechanisms Edison is already required to use. This approach also allows Edison to seek reimbursement for temporary housing costs that the WRCP entirely excludes, even though families must pay these costs to remain safely housed. In many cases, Edison may actually recover more through the Wildfire Fund than it currently pays under the WRCP.

The tools exist. The funding exists. Only Edison's decision is missing.

The system California created to stabilize utilities after wildfires must now be used to stabilize the people whose homes and lives were destroyed. The Wildfire Fund was built to prevent the humanitarian emergency unfolding today. Edison has the financial capacity, the legal authority, and a public framework designed to reimburse eligible wildfire costs after the company pays survivors, so it can act immediately.

Survivors cannot wait for litigation timelines. They cannot wait for procedural reviews. They cannot wait while their shelter disappears beneath them.

"We're paying Edison's profits every month on our bills, while sleeping in borrowed rooms. It can't be that ratepayers enrich shareholders while survivors go homeless." – Eaton Fire Survivor

9. How the Urgent Housing Relief Program Would Be Implemented

A clear, survivor-centered implementation plan ensures relief is fast, transparent, and free from coercion.

The Department of Angels [identifies](#) the cash-flow gap as the single greatest barrier preventing families from getting back home. Temporary housing support is the mechanism that restores stability and restarts recovery. Edison can deliver urgent housing relief quickly and responsibly through a survivor-focused trust administered by an independent, credible nonprofit entity. This structure ensures that funds reach displaced households without legal waivers, delays, or administrative barriers that slow or distort recovery.

The trust would distribute payments directly to verified households based on documented temporary housing and displacement costs. It would publish regular public reports and undergo independent audits to guarantee transparency, accountability, and proper stewardship of publicly backed dollars.

Many survivor-led groups, nonprofit housing organizations, and faith-based partners in the Eaton Fire area already maintain registries, manage direct-aid systems, and conduct home-by-home outreach. These partners stand ready to support outreach, verification, and survivor services so relief can be deployed quickly and at scale.

A major benefit of this structure is that it allows Edison to determine later which temporary housing costs to submit for reimbursement from the California Wildfire Fund. Because the WRCP excludes many real-world housing costs that families are paying today, this approach gives Edison the ability to recover a broader and more accurate set of expenses. In many cases, the reimbursable amount will exceed what the WRCP currently offers, precisely because WRCP valuations undervalue actual temporary housing needs. This model protects survivors while maximizing Edison's recovery options.

What qualifies and how verification works

Temporary housing advances will cover **verified, reasonable, and necessary** costs that families must incur in order to remain safely sheltered while cleanup, testing, remediation, and rebuilding proceed. Categories include:

- **Temporary housing expenses**, such as short-term or long-term rental housing, rooms, or non-luxury shelter required due to displacement.
- **Housing access costs**, including deposits, application fees, and credit checks needed to secure temporary housing.
- **Duplicate living costs**, including utilities and essential services at both the temporary residence and the damaged home.
- **Relocation and displacement expenses**, such as moving costs, storage, and transportation required because of the fire.
- **Health and safety costs**, including environmental testing, smoke and toxin cleanup, remediation, and other steps necessary to restore habitability.
- **Other verified temporary housing-related costs** that are reasonably necessary to maintain safe and continuous shelter during the recovery period.

Eligibility will be based on **verified unmet housing need**, not on whether a household has remaining ALE months on paper. ALE is temporary housing coverage provided by insurance, but it carries both time limits and dollar limits. Because Edison's fire drove housing costs far beyond what ALE was designed to support, many families have exhausted their ALE funds even though they still appear to have time remaining.

Verification procedures will ensure there is no duplication of costs already fully reimbursed by insurance, while still ensuring that families receive the temporary housing support necessary to remain safely sheltered.

All advances will be designated as **non-insurance humanitarian assistance**. They do not waive, replace, or satisfy any insurer's obligations. Any future insurance reconciliation or offset is strictly a matter between insurers and Edison, not survivors.

Program safeguards that ensure speed, integrity, and equity

A properly structured program would ensure:

- **Prompt delivery of relief.** Payments reach households quickly without requiring legal releases or settlement agreements. Keeping families housed now protects their ability to get back home later.
- **Support for verified needs only.** Assistance covers actual temporary housing, remediation, and displacement costs such as rent, deposits, duplicate utilities, transportation, and storage. Eligibility focuses on verified unmet housing needs rather than ALE calendars. This prevents homelessness while maintaining strict verification to avoid duplication of insurance payments. Any future reconciliation is strictly between insurers and Edison.
- **Transparent and inclusive oversight.** Survivors have representation in oversight, and the public can see how funds are used.
- **Full alignment with the California Wildfire Fund.** Edison can advance payments now and reconcile eligible amounts later once settlements are finalized, exactly as the Fund was designed to allow.

This implementation model is efficient, equitable, and legally sound. It ensures Edison meets its responsibility to the public while preventing avoidable mass displacement, stabilizing families throughout remediation and rebuilding, and restoring community trust shattered by the disaster.

"My home in West Altadena was the only home my child has ever known. We are eager to rebuild and move back. Our insurance isn't sufficient to cover it." – Eaton Fire Survivor

10. The Case for Acting Now

Edison has the capacity, the precedent, and the obligation to act now. Advancing temporary housing relief is the only path that prevents deepening harm and enables the Eaton Fire recovery to finally move forward.

1. Prevent deepening trauma

Housing instability is driving exhaustion, anxiety, and rising mental health emergencies. Immediate stabilization would stop the spiral and prevent avoidable loss of life and long-term harm.

2. Reduce long-term liability

Survivors pushed into bankruptcy, homelessness, or severe trauma will inevitably require larger settlements later. Early assistance reduces total future payouts, lowers litigation costs, and mitigates exposure related to emotional distress, unsafe living conditions, and wrongful-death claims.

3. Protect the Wildfire Fund and ratepayer money

By fronting temporary housing relief now and reconciling later, Edison can use its credit to bridge costs that the Wildfire Fund will ultimately reimburse. This reduces overall financial impact on both Edison and ratepayers while honoring the Fund's intended purpose.

4. Prevent long-term health costs and legal exposure

The Eaton Fire spread heavy metals, asbestos, and carcinogens into homes and neighborhoods. Funding proper remediation now prevents chronic illness and reduces future liability for both Edison and the Wildfire Fund.

5. Jump-start the Eaton Fire recovery and free up the local housing market

The Department of Angels [shows](#) that recovery remains largely stalled nearly a year after the fire because families cannot afford to stay housed long enough to complete repairs. Temporary housing support would immediately restart the recovery process.

6. Demonstrate accountability

Edison's profits are already underwritten by ratepayers and state guarantees, with shareholders protected by the Wildfire Fund structure. Using that publicly authorized stability to keep displaced families safely housed is not charity. It is accountability and a necessary step toward rebuilding trust with the communities Edison serves.

7. Protect the long-term stability of the community

Without temporary housing support, more families will be forced to leave the area permanently because they cannot afford post-fire rents. As households exit the region, more lots are sold instead of rebuilt, neighborhood cohesion fractures, local schools lose enrollment, and small businesses lose customers and workers. The result is a slower, weaker recovery with fewer families able to return and a diminished foundation for long-term community and economic vitality. Temporary housing relief is essential to keep families anchored so the community can rebuild as a community, not as scattered fragments.

Conclusion

The Eaton Fire recovery has reached a decisive moment. Families are being pushed out of housing because urgent support is being withheld while long-term processes grind forward. This gap is not accidental. It is the result of a choice.

California created the Wildfire Fund and approved rate hikes precisely to ensure that utilities could meet their obligations to survivors without delay. Edison has benefited fully from those protections. Its revenues are guaranteed, its credit is secure, and its wildfire exposure is borne by the public. Survivors, who are ratepayers funding this stability, have received no comparable protection.

Without urgent housing relief, displacement will become permanent. Families will be forced into premature settlements, driven out of their communities, and denied a real path home long before remediation and rebuilding

are complete. The costs of inaction will not disappear. They will resurface later as deeper social harm, greater public expense, and higher long-term liability.

The solution is straightforward and achievable now. Edison can front temporary housing relief to keep families housed, and be reimbursed later through the Wildfire Fund. This approach follows established precedent, preserves the integrity of future settlements, and prevents irreversible harm to families and communities.

Keeping families housed is not a discretionary act. It is the minimum required to make recovery possible. Edison has the capacity, the protection, and the responsibility to act. The time to do so is now.

👉 If you believe Edison must advance urgent housing relief now and recover those costs later, please add your name at edisonrelief.org.

Join the Coalition Calling on Edison to Advance Urgent Housing Relief

Every survivor of the Eaton Fire deserves a real path home. That path is disappearing as families exhaust insurance coverage, drain their savings, and face displacement long before their homes are safe to inhabit. Edison has both the capacity and the obligation to stop this outcome.

If your organization stands for fairness, accountability, and every family's right to get back home, please add your name, title, and organization at edisonrelief.org. Individuals are also invited to endorse and show their support.

This memo is available at efsurvivors.net/edisonhousingproposal. We encourage you to share it widely and help amplify this call for urgent housing relief.

Together, we can ensure Edison meets its responsibility and that every survivor has the chance to rebuild their lives, homes, and community.

Keep Eaton Fire families housed until they can get back home. Add your name: edisonrelief.org

Suggested Share Post and Images

Nearly after the Eaton Fire, 80% of families are still displaced – and running out of housing coverage. I've joined the civic coalition urging Edison to front urgent housing relief now. Add your name: edisonrelief.org #EdisonReliefNow #KeepFamiliesHoused #StandWithSurvivors

Civic Coalition for Urgent Housing Relief

80% of Eaton Fire families are still displaced – and running out of housing coverage.

Join the coalition calling on Edison to act now

edisonrelief.org



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